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Abstract.
The US remains far behind most other affluent countries in terms of life expectancy. One
of the possible causes of this life expectancy gap is the widespread availability of
firearms and the resulting high number of US firearm fatalities: 10,801 homicides in
2000. The European Union experienced 1,260 homicides, Japan only 22. Using multiple
decrement techniques, we show that firearm violence shortens the life of an average
American by 104 days (151 days for white males, 362 days for black males). Among all
fatal injuries, only motor vehicle accidents have a stronger effect. We estimate that the
elimination of all firearm deaths in the US would increase the male life expectancy more
than the total eradication of all colon and prostate cancers. Our results suggest that the
insurance premium increases paid by Americans as a result of firearm violence are
probably of the same order of magnitude as total medical costs due to gunshots or the
increased cost of administering the criminal justice system due to gun crime1.
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1. Violent Deaths due to Firearms: A US Phenomenon?
Life expectancy in the US reached a new high of 74.1 years for males and 79.5
years for females in 2000 (National Center for Health Statistics, 2002). However, the US
remains far behind most other affluent countries, with US life expectancy ranking 30th for
males and 29th for females among the 35 countries and territories that had a Gross
Domestic Product per capita, expressed in purchasing power, of at least $20,000 in 2000
(author’s calculations from Central Intelligence Agency data, 2002). Even within the US,
the gap between the life expectancies of Caucasians and African-Americans remains
significant: 74.8 years vs. 68.2 years for males, 80.0 vs. 74.9 for females2.
0

The life expectancy at birth e0 is a widely accepted measure of quality of life in a
society, summarizing in a single number all the natural and man-made damages that can
affect an individual, ranging from poor health care systems and civil war to unhealthy
nutrition and sexual behavior. It is commonly used to compare levels of public health
among populations, as it summarizes mortality at all ages and is not affected by the age
distribution of a population. The potential gain in life expectancy is considered one of
the best measures of the impact of eradicating a disease or condition. It is preferable to
using the number of years of potential life lost, which is heavily influenced by age
structure and total population size and does not account for the effects of competing risks
(Lai and Hardy, 1999).
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Levine et al (2001), noting that there has been no sustained decrease in black/white inequalities in
mortality rates since 1945, expect the disparity in life expectancy to either remain stable or increase over
the next decade.
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Several factors have been proposed to account for the relatively low US life
expectancy compared to peer countries, including higher infant mortality, income
inequality, and lack of a strong primary care system (Starfield, 2000). The World Health
Organization points out that certain population subgroups, such as Native Americans and
African-Americans from rural areas and poor urban neighborhoods, live in conditions of
poverty similar to those in developing countries (World Health Organization, 2000). It
also mentions high levels of violence, especially homicides, in comparison with other
industrialized countries. Because the majority of violent deaths in the US is firearmrelated, we believe this aspect of violence warrants further attention. The US is a country
that has chosen to live with guns, and now must face the consequences of this choice.
While the age-adjusted US firearm homicide rate has decreased by nearly 40% over the
last decade (figure 1), gun violence remains a huge tax on the US quality of life; its rate
of firearm fatalities far exceeds that of other industrialized countries.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

Figure 2 compares the crude firearm homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in
countries that have a population in excess of 3.8 million and a GDP per capita, adjusted
for purchasing power, in excess of $20,000 (World Health Organization, 2002). The US
rate dwarfs the rate of any other industrialized country. It is 5.5 times the next highest
rate (Italy). Several European countries have a firearm homicide rate that is insignificant:
only 45 firearm homicides were reported in the UK, 15 in Denmark, 10 in Norway, 7 in
Ireland. While the US experienced 10,801 firearm homicides, the European Union, with
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a total population of over 376 million in 2000, only recorded 1,260 homicides. Only
twenty-two firearm homicides occurred in Japan (population: 127 million), a country
where it has never been possible for most individuals to acquire a handgun. Less than 50
handguns are present in Japan; they are reserved to athletes participating in international
shooting competitions (United Nations on Crime Prevention and Crime Justice, 1999). A
comparison of age-adjusted death rates (such as Fingerhut et al, 1998) would provide
essentially the same results.
In 2000, 28,663 people in the US died from firearm injury: 16,586 from suicide,
10,801 from homicide, 776 unintentional, 270 from legal intervention, 230 undetermined
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2003). Note that 2000 was only the second
year since 1971 that firearm deaths numbered below 30,0003. Table 1 compares the 2000
total number of firearms deaths, firearm homicides, and firearm suicides for all major
racial groups, as well as crude rates of death per 100,000 inhabitants. These figures
suggest that the widespread availability of guns in the US increases the number of
homicides and suicides due to firearms. Cook (1981) estimates that every 10,000 guns
sold are involved in about 3,000 robberies and 100 homicides.

3

Figures have unfortunately increased since 2000: 29,573 firearm deaths in 2001 (11,348 homicides),
30,242 in 2002 (11,829 homicides).
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Table 1. Firearm deaths and crude rates per race and gender, 2000
RACE AND

FIREARM

GENDER

DEATHS

White Males

RATE

FIREARM

RATE

HOMICIDES

FIREARM

RATE

SUICIDES

17,750

15.96

3,686

3.31

13,214

11.88

White Females

3,195

2.78

1,120

0.97

1,960

1.70

Black Males

6,284

37.46

5,084

30.30

965

5.75

Black Females

770

4.16

615

3.32

125

0.67

Native Males

196

16.25

70

5.80

109

9.03

44

3.58

16

1.30

24

1.95

352

6.46

166

3.05

166

3.05

72

1.24

44

0.76

23

0.39

28,663

10.41

10,801

3.92

16,586

6.03

Native Females
Asian Males
Asian Females
Total

Table 1 suggests that firearm homicide may play a role, alongside many other
factors (such as socioeconomic status, unequal access to health care, and a primary health
care system that largely ignores disease prevention) in explaining the life expectancy gap
between whites and African-Americans. Adjusting for age, African-American males are
almost 7 times more likely to die by firearm homicide than white males, a ratio that has
changed little in the past 20 years (Levine et al, 2001).
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Firearm homicides disproportionately affect young people: in 2000, the average
age at death was 32.4 for white males, 39.3 for white females, 38.2 for black males, and
31.9 for black females (author’s calculations from Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention data, 2003). In contrast, firearm suicides mostly affect middle-aged white
males: whites are nearly twice as likely to die from firearm suicide as African-Americans,
and that gap has increased in the past 20 years. In 2000, the average age at death for
firearm suicides was 49 for white males, 46 for white females, 36.9 for black males, and
38.4 for black females.
Of course, deaths at early ages have a profound effect on life expectancies. While
the discovery of a new drug or procedure slowing down the effect of prostate cancer
would only have an insignificant effect on life expectancies, a drastic reduction in firearm
deaths would add many years of life to potential victims and possibly lead to a significant
improvement in US life expectancies. The purpose of this article is to evaluate the cost of
firearm violence in terms of life expectancies. We use actuarial multiple-decrement
techniques to estimate the reduction of life expectancy, by race and gender, due to
firearm deaths. In other words, we calculate the potential gain in life expectancy that
would result from a total elimination of firearm deaths. To put these results into
perspective, we also calculate the potential impact of eliminating other major causes of
death, such as other fatal injuries and major cancers. We then estimate the fraction of the
total premiums for term and whole life insurance due to firearm deaths.
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Many studies attempt to estimate the direct cost of firearm violence in terms of
medical treatment (Cook et al, 19994, Cook and Ludwig, 2000). Other costs are more
difficult to quantify. They include the cost of public resources devoted to law
enforcement, private investment by individuals in protection and avoidance5, lost
productivity of victims, and changes in the quality of life: limits on freedoms to live or
work in certain places, restrictions on residential and commercial location decisions,
limitations in hours of operations of retail establishments, emotional costs to the forced
adaptation to increased risk, and the cost of pain and fear. Cook and Ludwig (2000),
using a willingness-to-pay methodology, estimate the aggregate cost of gun violence in
the US at about $100 billion annually, or about $360 for every American. Other costs yet
to be evaluated included the loss of prestige of the US in the international scene or the
rejection of the US as a model society to emulate.
This article emphasizes costs that the scientific literature has yet to consider: the
increased cost of essential insurance policies, and the cost in terms of life expectancy
reduction. Section 2 summarizes the calculation of life expectancies under different
scenarios. Results concerning changes in life expectancies are presented in section 3 and
discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents changes in life insurance premiums. Section 6
concludes.

2. Estimation of Life Expectancies
Multiple decrement life tables, which allow examination of competing causes of
death, can be used to calculate life expectancies. Consider a life table
4

Cook et al estimate the mean cost of a firearm injury at about $17,000, in 1994 dollars. With about
135,000 fatal and non-fatal injuries per year, the total annual medical cost of gunshot injuries is around
$2.3 billion, with about half this cost borne by US taxpayers.
5
$1,800 annually per American household, according to one estimate (Anderson, 1999).
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{l x(? ) , x ? 0,1,2,..., w}, where l x(? ) is the number of individuals alive at exact age x. l 0(? ) , the

radix of the table, is chosen arbitrarily, usually 100,000. w is the last possible age at
death. The probability that an individual age x is still alive at age x+n is

(? )
n px ?

l x(?? )n
.
l x(? )

The complementary probability that an individual alive at age x has died n years later is
n

q x(? ) ? 1 ?

n

p x(? ) . When n=1, it is usually omitted: 1 q x(? ) ? q x(? ) . The complete expectation
0

0

of life at age x, denoted e x , can be calculated as e x ?

?

?

0

t

p x(? ) dt. It is the expected

number of years lived from age x.
The annual probability of death q x(? ) can be decomposed in two terms:
q x(? ) ? q x(1) ? q x( 2) , where q x(1) denotes the probability that an individual age x dies from a

firearm injury within a year, while q x( 2) is the probability of dying from any other cause.
Probabilities q x(1) and q x( 2) are called dependent, reflecting the crucial feature of multiple
decrement theory that all causes of death interact to produce a society’s mortality pattern.
The one-year conditional probability of death q x(1) depends not only on firearm injuries
but also on all other causes of death. In order to die from a firearm injury, an individual
first has to survive all other causes of death up to age x. Conditional on this event,
q x(1) gives the probability of dying between ages x and x+1 due to firearm injury.

Paradoxically, an improvement of HIV-related mortality –a disease often prevalent in the
same subgroups of society as firearm violence- would actually increase the probability of
firearm death.
Annual death probabilities q x(? ) for the US population, as well as gender- and
race-specific probabilities, are derived from the 2000 US Life Tables (National Center for
Health Statistics, 2002). The Injury Mortality Report (Centers for Disease Control and
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Prevention, 2003) provides the number of deaths by cause, age, gender, and race. Annual
firearm death probabilities q x(1) for homicides, suicides, and firearm violence, are
calculated using census population figures (US Census Bureau, 2003).

Dependent

probabilities q x( 2) are obtained by simple differencing.
The final step in the calculation consists in the calculation of independent or
absolute rates of decrement q x' ( 2) . These rates describe mortality patterns from which the
effects of firearm deaths have been removed. Using either a uniform distribution of
deaths assumption, or a constant force of mortality assumption, it can be shown that
independent rates can be obtained from the dependent probabilities using the relationship
(Bowers et al, 1977)

?

q x' ( 2) ? 1 ? 1 ? q x(? )

?

q (x2 ) / q (x? )

0

Integration of t p x' ( 2 ) ? 1 ? t q x' ( 2 ) provides life expectancies at birth e0 when firearm deaths
are removed. For a review of the different techniques that have been used by
demographers to remove the impact of a particular cause of decrement, see Preston,
Heuveline, and Guillot (2001).

3. Changes in Life Expectancies

The reduction in life expectancy, in days, due to firearm deaths, for the different
groups and causes of death, is found in Table 2. The average American loses 103.6 days
of life due to firearm deaths, including 45.9 days lost to homicides and 52.3 days to
suicides. The average white male loses five months, the average black male nearly one
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full year. Noteworthy is the huge impact of homicides for black males (nearly 300 days)
and suicides for white males (over 100 days).

Table 2. Reduction in life expectancies under different scenarios, in days, 2000
POPULATION
US
US Males
US Females
White Males
White Females
Black Males
Black Females

FIREARM
HOMICIDES
45.9
73.0
14.6
40.1
12.1
296.7
36.0

FIREARM
SUICIDES
52.3
85.2
14.6
101.7
17.6
50.1
6.8

ALL FIREARM
DEATHS
103.6
166.8
30.5
150.7
31.1
361.5
44.6

To place these effects in context, we calculate reductions in life expectancy due to
other injuries and cancers in 2000, for an average American, using data from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (2003) and the National Cancer Institute (2003).
Among all fatal injuries, only motor vehicle crashes, with 160.5 lost days, have a larger
effect than firearm violence (Table 3). Life expectancy reductions due to major cancers,
as well as the percentage of Americans who die from each cancer, are presented in Table
4. This table provides the increase in life expectancy that would result from a total
eradication of the cancer. Cancers reduce the life expectancy of Americans by 2.25
years, with lungs by far the deadliest site. The effect of firearm violence for males, in
terms of reduction in life expectancy, is much higher than the combined effect of all
colon and prostate cancers. The elimination of all firearm deaths would increase the male
life expectancy more than the eradication of all colon and prostate cancers.
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Table 3. Number of deaths and reduction in life expectancy, in days, due to various
injuries
INJURY
Firearms
Motor vehicle accidents
Other transportation
Adverse effects of medical
care and drugs
Drownings
Falls
Fires
Poisoning
Suffocation
Contacts with object
Machinery

# DEATHS
28,663
43,354
1,413
3,059
4,073
14,002
3,907
20,230
12,098
1,292
676

REDUCTION
103.6
160.5
4.9
6.3
17.3
24.8
13.0
66.4
38.8
4.4
2.1

Table 4. Life expectancy reduction, in days, due to cancer, and percentage of Americans
who die from cancer
CANCER
All, M+F
All, M
All, F
Lung, M+F
Lung, M
Lung, F
Colon, M+F
Colon, M
Colon, F
Ovaries, F
Breasts, F
Prostate, M

% OF DEATHS
21.15
22.87
19.85
5.38
6.36
4.53
2.28
2.35
2.22
1.06
3.01
3.12
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REDUCTION
821.3
753.9
867.8
196.8
199.3
184.5
66.8
63.3
68.0
45.9
144.7
46.5

Note. In gender-specific rows, figures are provided for the particular gender. For
instance, the “Ovaries, F” row indicates that 1.06% of women die from ovarian cancer,
and that females on average lose 45.9 days due to that cancer. The percentage of deaths
and days lost in the overall population would of course be about 50% lower.

4. Discussion
1. Firearm deaths partially explain the low US life expectancy
This study estimates the years of life lost to firearm deaths in the US, and the
contribution of these deaths to the gap in life expectancy between the US and other
affluent countries. In 2000, the US male life expectancy was 74.1 years, compared to an
average (weighted by population) of 75.8 years in the other 34 richest countries in the
world. The US thus suffers from a life expectancy gap of 1.7 years. Our calculations
show that 166.8 days or 26.86% of this gap can be explained by the disproportionate
number of US firearm deaths. For females, the US life expectancy of 79.5 years lags
2.56 years behind the average female life expectancy of the other 34 richest countries.
Firearm deaths, reducing the life of the average US female by 30.5 days, explain just
3.3% of the gap.
Within the US, 256.6 days, or 10.6% of the life expectancy gap between white
and black males of 6.6 years is due to firearm homicides. This is consistent with a
previous study that found that 14.1% of the racial disparity in life expectancy for males
was attributable to homicide by any means (Potter, 2001). Firearm homicides explain
much less of the racial disparity in life expectancy for females, accounting for just 1.3%
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of the gap. Excess firearm suicides among whites reduce the racial disparity in life
expectancy by 2.1% for males and 0.6% for females.
2. Firearm injuries have not been taken into account
Our calculations consider only firearm deaths and do not account for the increased
mortality rate of individuals who survive serious firearm injuries. For example, about
11,000 new cases of spinal cord injury are reported each year, 24.5% of them the result of
violence, primarily gunshot wounds (National Spinal Cord Injury Statistical Center,
2001). The life expectancy of a 20-year old who survived at least one year post spinal
cord injury is reduced by 6.3 years in case of paraplegia, 11.3 years in case of low
tetraplegia, 15.4 years in case of high tetraplegia, and 25.7 years in case of ventilator
dependency. Since these reductions (and comparable ones from other injuries such as
severe head trauma) have not been taken into account, the loss in life expectancy
attributable to firearms may be slightly underestimated.
3. Is there a substitution effect?
Our calculations assume that all firearm deaths are eliminated and not replaced by
homicides and suicides by other means. The existence of a substitution effect must be
considered. In countries where guns are not readily available, is there a substitution
process, where individuals commit suicide and kill each other with other weapons?
In the case of homicides, several international comparisons demonstrate that the
substitution effect is minimal or non-existent. Clarke and Mayhew (1988) find that the
rate of homicides committed with a handgun in the US is 174.6 times the rate observed in
England and Wales. If a substitution effect exists, the rate of homicides committed by
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other means would be much higher in England and Wales. On the contrary, it is 3.7
times higher in the US.
Sloan et al (1988) compare the crime rates in Seattle and Vancouver, two similar
cities in terms of population, climate, income per household, poverty and unemployment
rates. The only significant demographic difference lies in the racial composition of
minorities, with more Asians in Vancouver and more Hispanics and Blacks in Seattle.
Gun regulations are much stricter in Vancouver. In Seattle, handguns may be purchased
legally for self-defense in the street or at home. After a 30-day waiting period, a permit
can be obtained to carry a gun as a concealed weapon. Handguns need not be registered.
In Vancouver, self-defense is not considered a valid or legal reason to carry a gun.
Concealed weapons are not permitted. The purchase of a gun requires registration and a
restricted-weapons permit. Handguns can be transported in a car, but only if stored in a
locked box in the trunk. As a result, an estimated 41% of Seattle inhabitants own a gun
compared to only 12% of Vancouver inhabitants.
The authors find that the two cities essentially experience the same rates of
burglary, robbery, homicides and assaults without a gun. However, in Seattle the rate of
assault with a firearm is 7 times higher than in Vancouver, and the rate of homicide with
a handgun is 4.8 times higher. The authors conclude that the availability of handguns in
Seattle increases the assault and homicide rates with a gun, but does not decrease the
crime rates without guns, and that restrictive handgun laws reduce the homicide rate in a
community.
Killias (1993) uses gun ownership figures obtained through 28,000 telephone
interviews in 14 countries: Australia, Canada, the US, and 11 European countries. The

15

proportion of homes owning guns varies widely, from 1.9% in the Netherlands to 48% in
the US, with large variations within the US.

The author obtains highly significant

Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the percentage of households owning
guns and the rate of homicide with a gun (correlation = 0.746), the rate of suicide with a
gun (0.900), the overall homicide rate (0.658) and the overall suicide rate (0.515). If a
substitution effect exists, the correlations between gun ownership percentages and rates
of homicides and suicides by other means than a gun would be significantly negative.
They are not (resp. 0.441 and –0.015, both non-significant). The correlation of 0.441,
although not significant with this small sample, suggests that the number of homicides by
means other than a gun increases with raising levels of gun ownership. Thus, the data do
not support the existence of a compensation effect for homicides. Similar conclusions
were reached by Duggan (2000).
There is some evidence for a substitution effect for suicide. Reduced availability
of one method may prompt an increase by other methods (Rich et al, 1990; Sloan et al,
1990; Amos, Appleby and Kiernan, 2001). Some despondent individuals contemplating
suicide may attempt to take their life by another means if a firearm is unavailable. Indeed,
in countries such as Japan and Hong Kong, suicide rates exceed the US rate despite
strictly limited access to firearms. Less than 1% of suicides in these countries are
committed with a firearm (World Health Organization, 2003; Hemenway and Miller,
2000).
A recent study by Shenassa et al (2003) allows an estimation of this substitution
effect.

The authors study all 10,287 completed suicides and all 37,352 hospital

admissions due to attempted suicide recorded in Illinois between 1990 and 1997. Table 5
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provides the percentage of all episodes coded with a particular suicide method, as well as
the percentage of fatal cases for each method. Noteworthy is the extreme lethality of
firearm suicide attempts. Other techniques are relatively inefficient, due to a significant
part on the success of public policy measures such as reductions in the carbon monoxide
content of domestic gas, the development of less toxic sleeping pills and antidepressants,
and restrictions in the prescription of potentially lethal drugs.

Table 5. Percentage of cases and fatality rate of suicide methods
METHOD
Firearms
Poisons
Suffocations
Cuts
Crash/jumps
Exposure
Other

% OF TOTAL,
MALES
20.2
58.8
9.6
6.1
2.2
0.5
2.5

% FATAL,
MALES
96.5
11.1
90.7
9.9
76.1
64.0
2.4

% OF TOTAL,
FEMALES
2.3
87.8
1.8
4.1
0.8
0.3
2.9

% FATAL,
FEMALES
96.0
3.9
89.0
2.6
68.8
43.5
1.4

Note: Poisons: all episodes involving prescription drugs, over-the-counter drugs,
and toxic substances such as gasoline and household cleaning substances. Suffocation:
episodes involving hanging, strangulation, and suffocation. Cuts: all episodes involving
cutting or piercing instruments. Crash/jump: episodes involving crash into a moving
object or jump from a high place. Exposure: episodes involving electrocution or exposure
to heat or cold.

Excluding firearms, the average fatality rate of all other suicides techniques is
22.42% for males, 5.99% for females. We assume that, in the absence of a firearm,
suicide candidates select an alternative method in such a way that the relative proportion
of each method remains stable. The unavailability of a firearm then would reduce the
fatality rate of firearm suicides from 96.5% to 22.42% for males, and from 96% to 5.99%
for females.
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These figures probably overestimate the substitution effect in a significant way.
Indeed, they assume that every single firearm suicide attempt is replaced by an attempt
using another mean. According to Kleck (1991), firearms are the weapon of choice for
suicide attempts because (i) they are extremely lethal; (ii) death by firearm is perceived to
be painless; (iii) a gun suicide is easy to carry out with little effort required; (iv) the use
of guns require little expertise; (v) a gun suicide is quick, producing death before anyone
can intervene; (vi) other methods require a longer preparation time, thus increasing the
chances of changing one’s mind: (vii) the act of suicide reflects not only desperation, but
also a final attempt to be in control of events. Guns allow maximum control over that
final act; and (viii) male suicides are often motivated by some loss of effectiveness (loss
of a job, a relationship, physical strength,… ). The last thing a man wants is another
performance failure, hence the choice of a firearm. For all of these reasons, it is likely
that the unavailability of a gun would deter at least some suicide candidates from an
attempt.
Another reason for the overestimation of the substitution effect is that Shenassa et
al only consider suicide attempts that result in death or hospitalization. This overstates
the lethality of non-firearm techniques: while nearly every firearm attempt results in a
completed suicide or hospitalization, a significant percentage of unsuccessful attempts
involving poisons or cuts do not result in hospital treatment. Suicide attempts by other
means than firearms are thus undercounted, and their lethality is overstated.
Table 6 revises table 2, by introducing a substitution effect for suicides.

It

presents the reduction in life expectancy for the various subgroups of the US population,
assuming (i) no substitution effect for homicides; and (b) a substitution effect for suicides
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that reduce the lethality of firearm suicides to 22.42% for males and 6.99% for females.
For an average American, the number of days lost to firearms reduces from 103.6 to 95.8
when the substitution assumptions are inserted in calculations.

Table 6. Reduction in life expectancies under different scenarios, in days, assuming no
substitution effect for homicides, and a substitution effect for suicides.
POPULATION
US
US Males
US Females
White Males
White Females
Black Males
Black Females

FIREARM
HOMICIDES
45.9
73.0
14.6
40.1
12.1
296.7
36.0

FIREARM
SUICIDES
44.5
65.4
13.7
78.1
16.6
38.5
6.4

ALL FIREARM
DEATHS
95.8
147.2
29.6
127.2
30.0
350.2
44.2

5. Changes in Term Life Insurance Premiums

Firearm deaths increase the cost of life insurance. In this section, the increased
price of term and whole life insurance is estimated. Net single premiums are calculated
using the population tables, with and without firearm deaths, built in section 2. This
calculation overstates the true increased costs of insurance, as the mortality of insured
lives is significantly lower that the mortality of the general population. For instance, one
study (Metropolitan Life, 1982) suggests a (insured lives suicide rate) / (general
population suicide rate) ratio of 56% for males, 62% for females. Insured lives are selfselected in the sense that insurance applicants are more likely to be affluent, educated,
19

employed, and engaged in a stable relationship, than a person randomly drawn from the
general population. More selection due to the insurer’s underwriting process eliminates
many of the risks most likely to die as a result of firearms. Furthermore, death by suicide
is generally not covered during the first two years of a life insurance policy.
1
Table 7 compares the net single premiums 1,000 A25
:20 of a $1,000, 20-year,

discrete term insurance policy on a life age (25) at issue, under the different scenarios:
under the current situation, after elimination of all firearm homicides, all firearm suicides,
and all firearm deaths. An annual rate of interest of 5% is used. Table 8 presents the
percentage discounts that could be awarded if firearm deaths could be eliminated.

Table 7. Cost of $1,000 20-year term insurance, age at issue 25, under different scenarios
of elimination of firearm deaths
POPULATION

CURRENT

US
US Males
US Females
White Males
White Females
Black Males
Black Females

$17.16
$22.87
$11.48
$20.67
$ 9.99
$40.62
$21.71

FIREARM
HOMICIDES
$16.35
$21.53
$11.22
$19.95
$ 9.79
$34.19
$21.00

FIREARM
SUICIDES
$16.37
$21.54
$11.24
$19.07
$ 9.70
$39.58
$21.58

ALL FIREARM
DEATHS
$15.48
$20.07
$10.97
$18.21
$ 9.48
$32.90
$20.85

Table 8. Discounts, 20-year term insurance, age at issue 25, under different scenarios of
elimination of firearm deaths
POPULATION
US
US Males
US Females
White Males
White Females
Black Males

FIREARM
HOMICIDES
4.69%
5.88%
2.20%
3.48%
2.03%
15.82%

FIREARM
SUICIDES
4.61%
5.84%
2.03%
7.77%
2.88%
2.55%
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ALL FIREARM
DEATHS
9.78%
12.27%
4.42%
11.90%
5.13%
19.00%

Black Females

3.25%

0.59%

3.97%

Shorter term policies lead to larger discounts. For instance, the discounts to be
awarded for a 10-year discrete term policy on a white male life aged 25 at issue, amount
to 5.21% (firearm homicides eliminated), 9.57% (suicides removed), and 15.68% (all
firearm deaths excluded).
Table 9 compares the net single premiums 1,000 A25 of a $1,000, 20-year, fully
discrete whole life insurance policy on a life age (25) at issue, under the different
scenarios. Table 10 presents the percentage discounts that could be awarded if firearm
deaths could be eliminated.

Table 9. Cost of $1,000 whole life insurance, age at issue 25, under different scenarios of
elimination of firearm deaths
POPULATION

CURRENT

US
US Males
US Females
White Males
White Females
Black Males
Black Females

$ 98.11
$111.36
$ 85.32
$107.57
$ 82.59
$146.69
$108.37

FIREARM
HOMICIDES
$ 97.31
$110.08
$ 85.06
$106.87
$ 82.37
$140.94
$107.69

FIREARM
SUICIDES
$ 97.12
$109.75
$ 85.03
$105.66
$ 82.24
$145.66
$108.23

ALL FIREARM
DEATHS
$ 96.26
$108.34
$ 84.75
$104.82
$ 82.00
$139.67
$107.52

Table 10. Discounts, whole life insurance, age at issue 25, under different scenarios of
elimination of firearm deaths
POPULATION
US
US Males
US Females
White Males
White Females

FIREARM
HOMICIDES
0.82%
1.14%
0.31%
0.66%
0.26%

FIREARM
SUICIDES
1.01%
1.44%
0.33%
1.78%
0.42%

21

ALL FIREARM
DEATHS
1.89%
2.71%
0.67%
2.56%
0.71%

Black Males
Black Females

3.92%
0.63%

0.71%
0.13%

4.78%
0.78%

According to the American Council for Life Insurance (2001), there were 148
million group and 35 million individual term life insurance policies in force at the end of
2000. There were 125 million group and 8 million individual whole life policies in force.
The total annual premium income was $31,589 million in term and $98,289 million in
whole life. Applying the discounts of 9.78% for term (table 8) and 1.89% for whole life
(table 10) to these total premium volumes provides an estimate of $4.9 billion of the
insurance cost of firearm violence. This calculation overstates costs, as the mortality of
insured lives markedly differ from population mortality. Also, an age at issue of 25
results in high discounts, as homicides mostly affects young adults. Still, this
extrapolation suggests that increased insurance costs due to firearms are probably of the
same order of magnitude as total medical costs ($2 to $2.3 billion, Cook and Ludwig,
2000, Cook et al, 1999) or the increased cost of administering the criminal justice system
due to gun deaths, including incarceration costs ($2.4 billion, Cook and Ludwig, 2000).

6. Conclusion
Our findings suggest that the US life expectancy would improve significantly
with effective interventions to reduce firearm deaths. These deaths account for 26.86%
of the US males’ excess mortality when compared to peer nations, and 8.7% of the racial
gap between black and white males in the US. Although a causal link between the
availability of firearms and the rate of firearm deaths has not been proven definitively, a
body of US and international studies has consistently shown a strong correlation between
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firearm availability and homicide (Wiebe, 2003; Kellerman et al, 1993; Miller, Azrael
and Hemenway, 2002; Cummings et al, 1997). As policymakers seek to reduce racial
disparities in life expectancy in the US, and raise US life expectancy to the levels of peer
nations, the potential impact of reducing the availability of firearms should be considered.
In the US, about 80% of firearm homicides (and about 70% of firearm suicides) are
committed using a handgun, making this type of firearm a reasonable focus for
intervention.
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